Leonid Brezhnev
Leonid Brezhnev | |||||||||||||||||||||
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Леонид Брежнев | |||||||||||||||||||||
Official portrait, 1972 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union[a] | |||||||||||||||||||||
| In office 14 October 1964 – 10 November 1982 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Preceded by | Nikita Khrushchev (as First Secretary) | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Succeeded by | Yuri Andropov | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 4th Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet | |||||||||||||||||||||
| In office 16 June 1977 – 10 November 1982 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Leader | Himself | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Deputy | Vasily Kuznetsov | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Preceded by | Nikolai Podgorny | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Succeeded by | Vasily Kuznetsov (acting) Yuri Andropov | ||||||||||||||||||||
| In office 7 May 1960 – 15 July 1964 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Leader | Nikita Khrushchev | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Preceded by | Kliment Voroshilov | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Succeeded by | Anastas Mikoyan | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Second Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union | |||||||||||||||||||||
| In office 15 July 1964 – 14 October 1964 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Preceded by | Frol Kozlov | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Succeeded by | Nikolai Podgorny | ||||||||||||||||||||
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| Personal details | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Born | 19 December 1906 Kamenskoye, Yekaterinoslav Governorate, Russian Empire | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Died | 10 November 1982 (aged 75) Zarechye, Moscow Oblast, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Cause of death | Heart attack | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Resting place | Kremlin Wall Necropolis, Moscow | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Political party | CPSU (1929–1982) | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Spouse |
Viktoria Denisova (m. 1928) | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Children |
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| Residence(s) | Zarechye, Moscow Oblast | ||||||||||||||||||||
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| Awards | Full list | ||||||||||||||||||||
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| Military service | |||||||||||||||||||||
| Allegiance | Soviet Union | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Branch/service | Soviet Armed Forces | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Years of service | 1941–1982 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Rank | Marshal of the Soviet Union (1976–1982) | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Commands | Soviet Armed Forces | ||||||||||||||||||||
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Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev[b][c] (19 December 1906 – 10 November 1982)[5] was a Soviet politician who served as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1964 until his death in 1982. He also held office as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (head of state) from 1960 to 1964 and later from 1977 to 1982. His tenure as General Secretary and leader of the Soviet Union was second only to Joseph Stalin's in duration.
Leonid Brezhnev was born to a working-class family in Kamenskoye (now Kamianske, Ukraine) within the Yekaterinoslav Governorate of the Russian Empire. After the October Revolution's results were finalized through the creation of the Soviet Union, Brezhnev joined the ruling Communist party's youth league in 1923 before becoming an official party member in 1929. When Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, he joined the Red Army as a commissar and rose rapidly through the ranks to become a major general during World War II. Following the war's end, Brezhnev was promoted to the party's Central Committee in 1952 and became a full member of the Politburo by 1957. Later in 1964, he took part in the removal of Nikita Khrushchev as leader of the Soviet Union and replaced him as First Secretary of the CPSU. Upon ousting Khrushchev, Brezhnev initially formed part of a triumvirate alongside Premier Alexei Kosygin and CC Secretary Nikolai Podgorny that led the country in Khrushchev's place.[6][7][8] However, by the end of the 1960s, he had successfully consolidated power to become the supreme figure within the Soviet leadership.[9][10][11]
During his tenure, Brezhnev's governance improved the Soviet Union's international standing while stabilizing the position of its ruling party at home. Whereas Khrushchev regularly enacted policies without consulting the Politburo, Brezhnev was careful to minimize dissent among the party elite by reaching decisions through consensus thereby restoring the semblance of collective leadership. Additionally, while pushing for détente between the two Cold War superpowers, he achieved nuclear parity with the United States and strengthened Moscow's dominion over Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the massive arms buildup and widespread military interventionism under Brezhnev's leadership substantially expanded Soviet influence abroad, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. By the mid-1970s, numerous observers argued the Soviet Union had surpassed the United States to become the world's strongest military power.
Conversely, Brezhnev's leadership also witnessed a significant increase in repression and censorship throughout the Soviet Union compared to the relatively liberal years of the Khrushchev Thaw.[12][13][14] Ultimately, Brezhnev's hostility towards political reform ushered in an era of socioeconomic decline referred to as the Era of Stagnation. In addition to pervasive corruption and falling economic growth, this period was characterized by a growing technological gap between the Soviet Union and the United States.
After 1975, Brezhnev's health rapidly deteriorated and he increasingly withdrew from governing the country despite remaining its highest authority. He eventually died on 10 November 1982 and was succeeded as general secretary and head of state by Yuri Andropov. Upon coming to power in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev denounced Brezhnev's government for its inefficiency and inflexibility before launching a campaign to liberalize the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding the backlash to his regime's policies in the mid-1980s, Brezhnev's rule has received consistently high approval ratings in public polls conducted in post-Soviet Russia.
- ^ McCauley 1997, p. 48.
- ^ Brown 2009, p. 59.
- ^ "Brezhnev". Collins English Dictionary. HarperCollins.
- ^ "Brezhnev". Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary.
- ^ Jessup, John E. (11 August 1998). An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 1945–1996. Greenwood. p. 91. ISBN 978-0-313-28112-9.
- ^ Borrero, Mauricio (2006). "Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich 1906-1982". In Coppa, Frank J. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Modern Dictators:From Napoleon to the Present. Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. pp. 35–38, 37. ISBN 0-8204-5010-3.
- ^ Bacon 2002, p. 13.
- ^ Daniels 1998, p. 36.
- ^ McCauley 1997, p. 49 "In October 1964, Brezhnev became First Secretary (renamed General Secretary in 1966) of the Party with Aleksei Kosygin taking over as USSR Prime Minister, and Nikolai Podgorny becoming Soviet President. Just as after Stalin's death there was a collective leadership but Brezhnev wanted to become boss. His opportunity came in 1968 when the Prague Spring developed to such an extent that it appeared that the Communist Party of Czechoslovaki might lose power. In August 1968 the Soviet Union and several of its allies intervened and began the process of 'normalisation'. Brezhnev, as Party leader, took prime position during the conflict because Czechoslovakia was a socialist country and therefore under the supervision of the Soviet Communist Party. Kosygin who had launched some useful reforms, was pushed aside as economic orthodoxy became the order of the day. He lacked the political guts to fight for primacy. By 1969, one can regard Brezhnev as top dog."
- ^ Pearson 1998, pp. 79–80 "The political effect of '1968' [i.e. the 'Prague Spring'] was predictable. An immediate suspension of de-Stalinisation followed by an authoritative return to re-Stalinisation amounted to 'Neo-Stalinism Triumphant'. The supreme casualty in the Kremlin was Kosygin: like Khrushchev after '1956', Kosygin was blamed for causing the runaway crisis in eastern Europe by his disruptive and destabilizing reforms. Though retained within the supreme cadre of the Kremlin, Kosygin declined into a spent political force. From late 1968, the Khrushchev-Kosygin economic reforms were officially discredited and soon suffered cancellation across both the Soviet Union and most of eastern Europe. [¶] As the post-1964 Kremlin partnership of equals was dissolved and Kosygin demoted to the level of a sleeping partner, Brezhnev rose to sole supreme power. It was Brezhnev, long dubious about the strategy of subsidizing eastern Europe without tangible political return, who articulated the new imperial orthodoxy in an official 'doctrine' which was to be the mission statement of the Soviet Empire throughout the 1970s..."
- ^ Rigby 1989, pp. 41–42 "The record suggest that at least up to the late 1960s the power and authority of the new General Secretary were hardly adequate to ensure coherent and expeditious top-level decision-making. From about 1969 [Brezhnev's] primacy gradually became more evident and soon a 'cult' emerged embodying formulas that marked him out as clearly superordinated over the other party and state leaders. Gradually he succeeded in insinuating old cronies into high level posts and the first of them appeared in the top executive bodies. In 1977 Brezhnev was able to add to the General Secretaryship the post of President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a post whose importance had been builty up in the preceding years. In his last years in office the 'cult' intensified and several more of his old associates were added to the top executive."
- ^ Zubok 2009, pp. 190–191 "Both Stalinists and anti-Stalinists approved of Khrushchev's removal in October 1964. People who supported the Thaw and de-Stalinization believed that Khrushchev was a spent force and any future leadership would be better than his. Soon, however, they realized how wrong they were. The new guard in the Kremlin quickly terminated de-Stalinization from above. The majority of party leaders and ideologists did not like what they saw in the educated strata of society; growing individualism, creeping Westernism, popularity of American music and mass culture, growing pacifism, and pluralistic attitudes. Where the party ideologists failed, the KGB began to step in: a special division of Soviet secret police had the task of 'guiding' Soviet cultural and intellectual elites and 'shielding' them from 'harmful influences'...[¶]The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 substantiated the fears of the Soviet anti-Stalinist intelligentsia that the post-Khrushchev leadership might take the country in a neo-Stalinist direction. The crushing of the Prague Spring and its 'socialism with a human face' dashed the hopes of many educated Soviet patriots that the existing system could be reformed...[¶] Under Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leadership abandoned reformist projects. It was content to live with the fossilized ideology and sought to repress cultural dissent and force its participants into exile and immigration."
- ^ Saxonberg, Steven (2013). Transitions and Non-Transitions from Communism: Regime Survival in China, Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam. Cambridge University Press. p. 76. ISBN 978-1-107-02388-8.
...Brezhnev was trapped in a conservative legacy. He had come to power in order to end Khrushchev's experiments, which had threatened 'the security of tenure of Soviet officials'. He therefore set about immediately to undo Khrushchev's political and economic reforms. He eliminated the newly created regional economic councils, and reinstated the central economic ministries. He also reversed Khrushchev's cultural thaw, by tightening censorship and increasing control over cultural expression.
- ^ Coleman, Fred (1996). The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Empire: Forty Years That Shook the World, From Stalin to Yeltsin. MacMillan Publishers. pp. 26–27. ISBN 0-312-16816-0.
To Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, even Khrushchev's limited de-Stalinization risked going too far. Under Brezhnev, the posthumous rehabilitation of Stalin's purge victims virtually ceased. There could be no clearer signal of a change in thinking at the top. In the Brezhnev years, Russians began fearing that a return to Stalinist repression, or re-Stalinization, was a real danger. [¶]It never got that bad. There was no need to restore the mass terror. Brezhnev accomplished what he wanted simply by keeping the threat alive. His KGB secret police...remained above the law...They were the living symbol of Brezhnev's rule, the enforcement machinery he showed the nation he was keeping oiled and ready. Arrest a few leading dissidents and sentence them to life-threatening conditions in the Gulag, and the rest of the population, still haunted by the Stalinist past, would get the message: toe the line or all is lost...[¶]Taking yet another page from Stalin's lesson book, they determined to give their narrow repressions a firm legal base. During the second year of Brezhnev's eighteen-year rule, the criminal code was revised to punish 'anti-Soviet activities'. From then on, anyone who criticized the Soviet leaders or their policies or the system could be locked away in a labor camp or expelled from the country...[¶]These laws, regarded in the West as repulsive, served their purpose in Russia, effectively crushing dissent for two decades...Brezhnev proved there was no essential need to re-Stalinize. Simply halting the de-Stalinization produced the desired results—at least for a while.
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